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Platonism of the Future 
Patrick Lee Miller 
 
Buying textbooks, writing syllabi, and putting on armor. This is how many 
students and teachers prepared to return to campus this past fall. The last few 
years have witnessed an intensifying war for the soul of the university, with 
many minor skirmishes, and several pitched battles. The most dramatic was last 
spring at Evergreen State, shortly before the end of the spring semester.1 
Perhaps the most dramatic since then has been at Reed College.2 There is no 
shortage of examples, filling periodicals left and right. Wherever it next 
explodes, this war promises more ferocity, causing more casualties—careers, 
programs, ideals. 
What’s at stake? According to Michael Aaron, writing after the battle at 
Evergreen, the campus war is symptomatic of a broader clash of three 
worldviews contesting the future of our culture: traditionalism, modernism, and 
postmodernism.3 The traditionalists, he writes, “do not like the direction in 
which modernity is headed, and so are looking to go back to an earlier time when 
they believe society was better.” Whether they oppose changes to sexual mores 
or American demographics, Aaron adds, “these folks include typical status-quo 
conservatives, Evangelical Christians as well as more nefarious types such as 
white nationalists and the ‘alt right’.” In his estimation, they are done. 
He concedes that the election of Trump has empowered them, but he believes 
“they have largely been pushed to the fringes in terms of their social influence.” 
A few hours in front of FoxNews, or browsing the massive comment threads of 
some PragerU videos, would disabuse him of this illusion. Traditionalists are very 
influential in the national culture of the U.S.A, if not other countries, and 
                                                        
1 http://www.chronicle.com/article/A-Radical-College-s-Public/241577 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-campus-mob-came-for-meand-you-professor-could-
be-next-1496187482 
2 https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/11/the-surprising-revolt-at-
reed/544682/ 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/09/11/reed-college-course-lectures-
canceled-after-student-protesters-interrupt-class 
3 http://quillette.com/2017/06/08/evergreen-state-battle-modernity/ 
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hopeful predictions of their retreat have all proven false. But Aaron is correct, in 
a way. When these traditionalists talk about the future, they suspend their 
intellects, projecting onto it the past—and more often than not, an imaginary 
version of the past.4 Make America Great … again? 
Aaron is right, then, if by “social influence” he means the society of the 
academy, where many of the intelligent, informed, and innovative conversations 
about the future occur. With a few notable exceptions—Robert George of 
Princeton, for instance—traditionalists of that sort are marginal to these 
conversations. Nationally, most of them are speaking to each other, preferring 
the training camp to the front lines. Rod Dreher’s Benedict Option (2017) openly 
summons them to this withdrawal. “It is between the modernists and 
postmodernists,” Aaron rightly claims, “where the future of society is 
being fought,” and the battlefield is indeed the university. How, then, does he 
characterize these two opponents? 
“Postmodernists,” he says, “eschew any notion of objectivity, perceiving 
knowledge as a construct of power differentials.” That’s as good a short 
summary as any, and Aaron adduces plenty of examples to show how this 
philosophical attitude ripples through the beliefs and behavior of people who 
may never have read Foucault, Derrida, or Lyotard. Focusing on “the 
Weinstein/Evergreen State affair,” he argues that it “poses a significant 
crossroads to modern society, extending well beyond the conflict occurring on 
campus.” Weinstein’s well-reasoned letter against the Day of Presence could 
have been debated rationally, on its objective merits, in the manner of 
modernism. Instead, it was treated as a racist incident, an exertion of white 
power, a move in the postmodern game of knowledge construction. 
Just because postmodernism corrupts a university in this way, however, the 
vindication of modernism does not follow. That would follow only if two 
conditions were satisfied: if the three options Aaron states are really the only 
ones, and the other two (traditionalism and postmodernism) have been soundly 
eliminated. Let us assume that traditionalism of the sort Aaron describes has 
indeed been soundly eliminated. Let us also assume that postmodernism as a 
viable ideology for a functioning university has also been soundly eliminated. 
                                                        
4 https://hyperallergic.com/383776/why-we-need-to-start-seeing-the-classical-world-
in-color/ 
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Isn’t that enough to satisfy those two conditions and render Aaron’s argument 
sound? In a word, no. 
To see why, let us begin with the elimination of postmodernism. Evergreen is 
indeed the reductio ad absurdum of postmodernism as a viable ideology for a 
functioning university. Students wandering campus with baseball bats in search 
of a professor, administrators not permitting campus police to protect him, more 
than fifty faculty members demanding his punishment for taking his argument 
to the media … this is madness, and it will inevitably self-destruct, if it hasn’t 
already.5 But that does not invalidate postmodern critiques of modernism and its 
aspiration to seek objective truth. 
 
 
1. Postmodern Critiques 
 
The best of them stem from Nietzsche. Postmodernists particularly cherish an 
essay he wrote early in his career, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.6 “In 
some out of the way corner of the universe,” he began it, “there was a star on 
which clever beasts invented knowing.” The star is quickly extinguished, the 
beasts and their knowledge disappear, and nothing is lost. Nietzsche compares 
the philosophers’ traditional glorification of knowledge—as something oriented 
toward reality, as something good for its own sake—to the gnat’s pride in flying. 
We humans value it not because it helps us live more truly, but because it makes 
us proud. Knowledge and its truths do not show us the world as it is. They 
operate in another direction, helping us create a flattering “reality” for 
ourselves. Deception, in sum, is the purpose of our vaunted cognition. 
 “Truths are illusions,” Nietzsche wrote in the same essay, “which we have 
forgotten are illusions.” Societies no less than individuals deceive themselves in 
order to believe a flattering ‘truth’; the same holds for our whole species. 
Whenever human intellect comes to the brink of some real truth that might 
disillusion us, humiliate us, we turn away in shame or fear, followed immediately 
by anger at whoever dared try to educate us. Hasn’t that been an effect of much 
modern science, which keeps displacing us from the center of the cosmos? The 
Galileo case is iconic, but more illustrative is that of Darwin. He suffered no 
                                                        
5 https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-madness-at-evergreen-state-1506034740 
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Truth_and_Lies_in_a_Nonmoral_Sense 
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inquisition, thanks to the freedom of speech enjoyed by the British of his era, but 
his account of human nature has nearly always been met with scorn from 
religious believers, whether in Kansas or Turkey.7 
With this scorn, such traditionalists have retreated from the battle for our 
intellectual future, however, so the greater scandal is that Darwinism is still 
largely ignored—still!—by thinkers in the humanities and social sciences whose 
work it most of all concerns. These thinkers generally respond to evolutionary 
arguments about gender, for example, the way Republicans respond to the 
arguments of climate science—not usually by reading them and offering 
objective assessments of their content, but more often by contemptuously 
neglecting them as irrelevant or excoriating their proponents with vague ad 
hominem attacks. Witness the controversy over James Damore’s Google memo. 
The contempt and indignation of most of his critics was inversely proportional 
to their understanding of the relevant science.8 
Was Nietzsche therefore right that truths are illusions? Hardly, a champion of 
the modern Enlightenment will retort: widespread stubbornness to assimilate 
complex and politically incorrect scientific truths does not vindicate 
postmodernism. Professors, journalists, and the people whose opinions they 
shape may adhere to illusory articles of “knowledge” and “truth,” but it does not 
follow—as the postmodernists would have it—that empirical science is pointless. 
Far from it. What about the Darwinian truths that exposed these specific 
illusions as such? What about scientific truths more generally? We may be 
swimming in a sea of prejudice, propaganda, and popular myths, but empirical 
science is a saving buoy. Only by knowing the truth can we see the illusions for 
what they are. Postmodernism does not subvert knowledge and truth, it covertly 
presumes them.  
Knowledge and truth, mind you, not empirical science. For empirical science 
is nothing more than a method, a discipline, a way of seeking knowledge and 
truth. It cannot succeed unless its strictures be obeyed. There are always 
individuals who fail to follow these strictures—usually accidentally, sometimes 
deliberately—and this is why it is best done in a community. Rituals such as 
blind peer-review, for example, minimize the risk of sloppy or deceitful 
                                                        
7 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/world/europe/turkey-evolution-high-school-
curriculum.html 
8 http://quillette.com/2017/08/31/google-memo-economist-nothing/ 
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conclusions gaining credence. But the errors of individuals can become the 
errors of communities.9 This is why every era has had its spurious sciences. The 
19th century had phrenology, which we now dismiss as quackery, while forgetting 
the prestige it enjoyed for a few decades as well as the principal scientists who 
promoted it. More troubling are the spurious sciences whose main figures we 
still remember and celebrate. 
The greatest figure of the modern Enlightenment, Kant, is still studied 
reverently for, among other achievements, developing an ethics for which 
persons were obliged by moral duties and protected by moral rights thanks to 
their rationality. Act only on those maxims, he instructed, which could 
reasonably function as universal laws. His ethics appears to have been rationalist 
and universalist: it applied to every rational being. But who counted as rational? 
Critical race theorists have drawn attention to Kant’s racism, which was never 
hidden, but propounded by the philosopher himself in series of lectures and 
texts that proved to be seminal for “scientific” racism. 
Kant divided humanity into four races, as follows: first, “humanity exists in its 
greatest perfection in the white race”; second, “the yellow Indians have a 
smaller amount of Talent”; third and fourth, “The Negroes are lower and the 
lowest are a part of the American peoples.”10 Kant’s ethics were not universalist, 
argues Charles Mills, because they were conjoined to a theory of the races that 
deemed only whites fully rational.11 Twenty years later, Kant himself denounced 
slavery and colonialism, but he never renounced the racism that could still 
rationalize both by denying non-whites moral rights (to freedom and property, 
for example).  
He was not alone. Other major Enlightenment philosophers—e.g., Locke, 
Voltaire, Hume—were also racist, so today’s political thinkers who wish to draw 
from their tradition hope to purify its central insights of the inegalitarian 
elements inherited from its foundation. The most prominent such effort has 
been John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971), which bases its political 
prescriptions on an imaginary scenario, “the original position,” in which pure 
rational agents contract a political order. They will decide according to their 
                                                        
9 https://heterodoxacademy.org/2017/01/27/why-viewpoint-diversity-also-matters-in-
the-hard-sciences/ 
10 From Kant’s Physical Geography, translated and quoted by Eze (1997: 118). 
11 Mills 2017. 
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individual interests, he proposes, but because they are behind a “veil of 
ignorance,” pure of particular identities (Rawls mentions social status, class, 
intelligence, and strength, but remarkably neither race nor sex), none will 
promote the interests of one group above the others. The result will therefore be 
just.  
This strategy of purification came under attack from many quarters for this 
very conceit. Feminists such as Carole Pateman, for instance, have argued that 
the ostensibly sexless rational agents are in fact men because the original 
position occludes the distinctly female contribution to their existence: childbirth 
and mothering. Just as Kant’s ethics were a rationalization for slavery and 
colonialism, then, Rawls used his theory of justice to “confirm ‘our’ intuitions, 
which include patriarchal relations of subordination.”12 Ironically, Pateman’s 
general critique finds support from evolutionary psychology, which teaches that 
the intuitions of men and women—as populations, mind you, and only on some 
matters—are significantly different.13  
Again, then, Darwinism confirms an important postmodern insight. Has 
empirical science therefore shown itself again as a sure route to knowledge and 
truth? Well, an empirical science is only as reliable as the community that 
sustains it. How reliable, then, is the scientific community? In its own self-
conception, needless to say, it is quite reliable. Phrenology and “scientific” 
racism are sad chapters in its history; yet it was empirical science in the end that 
discredited them. With merit, scientists thus take pride in their rationality. 
However irrational they may be at times, especially when they speak outside 
their specialties, when they speak within them nowadays, they put aside their 
feelings, identities, and private ambitions to be objective, dispassionate, 
rational. Or so they feel.  
But unless they were to rely on their feelings here, and oddly here alone, they 
should subject this self-conception to scientific investigation. Fortunately, some 
of them already have.  
 
 
 
                                                        
12 Pateman 1988: 42. 
13 https://heterodoxacademy.org/2017/08/10/the-google-memo-what-does-the-
research-say-about-gender-differences/ 
Platonism of the Future 
 
7 
 
2. The Science of Reason 
 
The phenomenon of confirmation bias is by now widely recognized.14 When 
people hold beliefs, they actively seek evidence to confirm those beliefs, while 
ignoring contrary evidence. Correlatively, they ignore evidence that supports 
rival beliefs, while actively seeking evidence against them. The mechanism is 
thus better known as myside bias, and the best scientific account of rationality—
the Darwinian account of Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber—explains why it was 
advantageous for humans to develop it.15  
On the face of it, myside bias in human reasoning presents a challenge to 
Darwinism. Wouldn’t it have been more advantageous for our species to have 
developed reasoning that was oriented toward the truth rather than toward 
myside’s belief? Wouldn’t a species doomed to always to trust its own beliefs, no 
matter how wrong, eventually lose the struggle for survival? No. An orientation 
of reasoning toward truth would appear to be more advantageous only when we 
imagine an individual reasoning and trying to find the truth on his own. An early 
man inquires whether he should move to higher ground. Believing that he need 
not do so, yet hesitating to reason about it, his inquiry would be compromised by 
his myside bias—he would focus on the weather’s similarity to regular patterns, 
for example, and ignore its similarities to dangerous ones. If he’s wrong, the 
error could cost him his life.  
Our distant ancestors, however, were rarely left to their own devices. Instead, 
they reasoned in groups. Rather than everyone in a group considering the 
problem—a collective, if you will, of individual reasoners—it was more efficient 
for camps within the group to argue for rival positions before an audience. One 
side, believing it imperative to move to higher ground before an impending 
flood, could articulate the best arguments for doing so and the best objections to 
not doing so. By contrast, the other side, believing this would be a waste of 
resources because the flood would not come, could marshal the best arguments 
to counter its opponent. Each camp’s inquiry would be compromised by myside 
bias, but the whole group would benefit from highly motivated advocates on 
both sides of the question. 
                                                        
14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias 
15 Mercier and Sperber 2017: 218–19. 
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What would motivate them? Reason itself, whose purpose is social. “Giving 
reasons to justify oneself and reacting to the reasons given by others are, first 
and foremost,” write Mercier and Sperber, “a way to establish reputations and 
coordinate expectations.”16 Before the tribal council, where you propose that 
everyone move to higher ground, or whatever, if you cannot supply reasons for 
your belief, you begin to lose credibility. When you can supply reasons, not to 
mention objections to rival views, if your arguments prove persuasive, people 
begin to trust you, you gain status within the group, and thus power. Your power 
will erode, by contrast, if the beliefs for which you have argued turn out to be 
false. If this happens often, your power will be gone. So reason must heed reality 
to work its purpose. But its purpose is not to heed reality. Its purpose is to 
acquire status and power. 
Foucault was thus onto something when he said that “‘truth’ is linked in a 
circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it.” 17 
Following Nietzsche’s little essay, though, he went too far. For even if our claims 
to knowledge and truth are all justified within social institutions, even if they are 
all proposed by humans guilty of myside bias and greedy for honor, they are not 
all thereby illusions. Some of them are wrong, to be sure, but some of them are 
right. Such exaggeration has cost postmodern philosophy much credibility 
among circumspect thinkers. Nevertheless, good science has again confirmed its 
central tenet, at least when it is soberly qualified: science itself functions to 
some extent like any other human practice; its practitioners reason in order to 
secure status and power.   
Foucault wrote histories that exposed practices, institutions, and ideologies of 
truth and justice as in fact regimes of power. In other words, he showed them to 
be pretentious and hypocritical, and he was very often right. The modern 
American prison system, for example, pretends to rehabilitate criminals in its 
so-called correctional facilities, rather than subject them to the cruel and 
unusual punishments prohibited by the framers of the American constitution 
(e.g., drawing and quartering). In fact, however, it throws them into an 
environment designed to torture them in soul as well as body.18 Foucault 
                                                        
16 Mercier and Sperber 2017: 143. 
17 Gordon 1980: 133. 
18 Foucault 1977. 
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exposed such hypocrisy in courts and prisons, medicine and psychiatry, churches 
and schools, among other modern regimes of truth-power.  
Accordingly, to call for a return to modernism, as if postmodernism has 
simply been a temporary fit of cultural madness, is itself an illusion. Those who 
make this call, such as Aaron, are showing myside bias on a grand scale. They are 
not alone. A mirror image of this bias can be found among advocates of 
postmodernism. Both sides are focusing on what is good about their own camp 
and bad about its rival, while ignoring what is good about its rival and bad about 
their own camp.  
 
 
3. Modernism vs. Postmodernism 
 
Advocates of modernism, on one hand, would have us focus on the wonders of 
empirical science, along with the rights and freedoms of constitutional 
democracy. These are the two proudest legacies—the first theoretical, the 
second political—of Enlightenment philosophies. They should be praised, 
defended, and preserved. But these advocates would also have us ignore modern 
philosophy’s shortcomings. And yet only now, and still not widely enough, are 
proponents of this tradition coming to terms with the racism and sexism integral 
to it. The Enlightenment philosophers were racist and sexist, granted, but can’t 
their practical philosophies be purified of their personal failings and marginal 
writings?  
Maybe, maybe not, but let’s imagine that they could. You can still make a 
decent living trying to solve the theoretical puzzles introduced by the 
philosophies of the 17th and 18th centuries. If the world is composed ultimately of 
inanimate matter, as many of them proposed, it is still hard to see how it is 
possible to have animate minds capable of knowledge, let alone choosing freely 
to act rightly in such a world.19 Only now, and still not widely enough, are 
proponents of these philosophies coming to terms with the Nietzschean 
critiques that undermine them. For decades in Anglo-American philosophy it 
was acceptable to ignore these critiques, dismissing Nietzsche as a madman or a 
proto-Nazi, but those dismissals now appear defensive. 
                                                        
19 http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-illusionist 
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The revival of Nietzsche’s popularity is to a large extent due to his 
postmodern epigones. Surveying the failures of modern philosophies, advocates 
of postmodernism have shown a myside bias of their own, focusing on its sound 
critiques of modern theories and practices, while ignoring its own theoretical 
and political weaknesses. After all, any philosophy that rejects the notions of 
truth, knowledge, and goodness, while presenting itself as true, known, or at 
least better than its predecessors, soon appears as hypocritical as it showed them 
to be. Yet if advocates of postmodernism are not saying that its philosophies and 
politics are at least better than their modernist rivals, what are they saying? 
Even when this theoretical problem is ignored, the egalitarian pretenses of its 
advocates are belied by the politics of both its founders and its recent 
permutations. Nietzsche was a proto-fascist, celebrating war as healthy for a 
state, slavery a requirement for its greatness.20 Foucault, for his part, supported 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary movement, writing that it “impressed me in 
its attempt to open a spiritual dimension in politics.”21 Seen against this 
background, the illiberal and sometimes violent protests of left-wing students at 
Evergreen, Middlebury, and Berkeley should come as no surprise. 
Nor should it come as a surprise that postmodern rhetoric—which rejects 
moral judgments—has been adopted by violent right-wing counterparts. 
Consider, for example, Richard Spencer, who coined the term “alt-right” and has 
achieved national notoriety for two videos: in one, shortly after the presidential 
election, he is seen leading fellow white-supremacists with chants of “Hail, 
Trump!” to which some in his audience reply with Hitler salutes; in the other, he 
is giving an interview on the street after the Trump inauguration and is sucker-
punched by an antifa protestor.  
Apparently new to street-brawling, Spencer is more accustomed to quarreling 
with left-wing intellectuals. He was, after all, a doctoral candidate in the 
humanities at Duke University, a center for postmodern philosophy. There he 
absorbed the identity-politics that characterize the humanities in such places. 
“Trump’s victory was, at its root,” Spencer has said, “a victory for identity 
                                                        
20 See, for example, The Greek State, and essay contemporaneous with On Truth and Lies 
in the Nonmoral Sense. Both are available in Pearson and Large 2006. 
21 “What are the Iranians Dreaming About,” Le Nouvel Observateur, October 16–22, 1978. 
Also excerpted on pp. 203–9 Afary and Anderson 2005. The original article is available 
here: http://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/007863.html 
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politics.” Indeed, anyone familiar with the politics of the progressive 
professoriate will notice how he has adapted it for the regressive purpose of 
promoting white identity. Of the influence of social-justice warriors on his 
movement, he said tersely: “They made us.”22 
There are thus assets and liabilities to both philosophical approaches—the 
modernist, on one hand, and the postmodernist, on the other. Recognizing this 
is not to call a draw, nor to propose an incoherent compromise. Remembering 
the purpose of reasoning from Mercier and Sperber, what we need to adjudicate 
this dispute is something like a massive cultural council, a forum in which the 
advocates of these two alternatives may present their cases, a forum where their 
evidence would be evaluated and their arguments would be assessed for their 
soundness. Simply to call for reasoned assessment is to prejudice the contest 
against postmodernism. So be it. Does modernism thus win by default? Only if 
there are no other alternatives. 
 
 
4. The Limits of Science 
 
Science exerts a strong pull on the conscience of everyone who values reasoned 
assessment. How could it not, when it has yielded so many marvels in so short a 
time? In the global tribal council, so to speak, empirical science has established 
its credibility more often than not. The history of science reminds scholars of 
phrenology or cold fusion, but these failures are eclipsed by its successes. And 
prominent among these successes are those which have discredited elements of 
traditional worldviews, from Galileo to Franklin to Darwin, right up to the 
present. Does esteem for science thus decide the epochal question finally for all 
but reactionary traditionalists and intransigent postmodernists? No: not because 
it is a participant in the contest, but because it is incapable of rendering such a 
judgment. 
First of all, empirical science describes the world, it does not prescribe any way 
to live in it. Empirical scientists can build a nuclear bomb, for example, but their 
expertise cannot tell you whether you should drop it, let alone where or when. 
                                                        
22 http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/richard-spencer-trump-alt-right-
white-nationalist 
 
Miller 
 
12 
 
Clashes of values cannot be resolved by the scientific community; clashes of 
worldview are way beyond their pale. Scientists can subvert or confirm any 
empirical claims made within a worldview (geocentrism, divine lightning, a 
decisive fall from innocent paradise, and so on), but the worldview and its basic 
injunctions will always be immune to scientific critique or corroboration. 
Physical science cannot disprove the existence of an immaterial spirit or an 
omnipotent God. Nor can it legitimately conclude that humans have a right to 
life, or property, or happiness.   
So, postmodernists zealous to achieve gender equality by presuming that 
gender is entirely a social construction can be tamed by evolutionary 
psychology’s findings about natural sex differences. Judith Butler is wrong that 
“what gender ‘is,’ is always relative to the constructed relations in which it is 
determined.”23 But whether she is also wrong that sex and gender are essential to 
who we really are—our personal identity, or subjectivity, in the jargon of 
philosophers—is not a question empirical scientists can answer. How could a 
scientist operationalize the notion of who we really are? This not a hypothesis at 
all; it’s a first principle of a worldview.  
In Butler’s case, it is the Nietzschean worldview according to which there is 
no person, no subject, no agent doing one’s deeds; one simply is the deeds 
themselves.24 Butler adds the twist that some of these deeds are gendered—
performances such as wearing make-up or wrestling in the schoolyard—so that 
becoming a person requires simultaneously becoming a gender.25 For Kant, and 
most other philosophers, ancient or modern, there is a person doing one’s deeds, 
a free agent responsible for them, and in many accounts a soul that will be 
judged by them. No scientist could decide this question, or for that matter stake 
a claim anywhere in such a debate. On such questions, empirical science is silent. 
Similarly, whether truth is power and all knowledge claims but pretentious 
power-grabs—these are not hypotheses that scientists could test empirically. 
Like many postmodern theses, these are first principles of a worldview as old as 
the Greek Sophists.26 The best refutation of it can still be found in the works of 
Plato, beginning with his Theaetetus, where Socrates engages with the best of the 
                                                        
23 Butler 1999, 15 
24 On the Genealogy of Morality 1.13. 
25 Butler 1993: 232. 
26 http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2016/11/truth-in-the-age-of-trump.html 
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original truth-relativists, Protagoras, and exposes his hypocrisy.27 He traveled 
the Greek world selling his expertise, mastery of persuading crowds. Pushed to 
account for it, he denies that it is knowledge of anything really true; it is merely 
an ability to substitute better appearances for worse. Better, though, by which 
measure? By appearances, to be consistent. Protagoras is not really an expert, 
then, he only appears to be one. But in his worldview there is no difference. 
Modernists believe there is a difference between appearance and reality, that 
something which seems true can be discredited by showing that it is not really 
so. Thus, if they still believe a universal morality can be derived from humans’ 
empathy for one another, they should investigate social psychology’s findings 
about it (and tribalism) to revise their belief.28 But whether humans nonetheless 
have universal rights—upon some other basis, perhaps personhood, however 
that be understood—is not a hypothesis empirical scientists can test. The notion 
of rights cannot be operationalized any more than person could be. Social 
psychologists may of course study cultures’ beliefs about rights. But what about 
real rights, the kind governments are morally bound to respect, whatever a 
culture’s beliefs?  
Locke argued that European settlers had earned a right to their American 
properties by mixing their agricultural labor with the land in a way the native 
hunter-gatherers of that continent had not done. Marx saw such arguments as 
fixtures of capitalist ideology, the sort of fictions that bewitch the mind of the 
proletariat and keep them from simply taking what they need to achieve 
equality. Who was right: Locke or Marx? No scientist could decide such a 
question, let alone stake a claim anywhere in the debate. For it’s not question of 
empirical science. If you desire to maximize wealth, empirical science can help 
you achieve your desire. So likewise for the desire to achieve equality (between 
races, sexes, classes, etc.). But whether you should desire such things, and 
whether you should make them the goals of your political efforts—these are not 
scientific questions. 
Empirical science cannot even fully underwrite its own claims to knowledge 
and truth. Do scientific experiments yield knowledge? Do they show us the 
                                                        
27 Theaetetus 161–67. 
28 http://bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy 
https://theconversation.com/does-empathy-have-limits-72637 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/09/can-democracy-survive-tribalism.html 
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truth? These are not scientific questions, properly speaking, because they cannot 
be answered by empirical means. Any experiment designed to underwrite the 
validity of experimentation would of course beg the question. More 
fundamentally, though, empirical science relies on the senses, but are the senses 
reliable? This cannot be shown scientifically without begging the question. The 
science of optics may very well teach us when and where our eyes function well. 
But even when they are functioning well, do they present us with the real world, 
or only an appearance of it?  
So how can these questions be answered? How can the claims of empirical 
science be underwritten? Postmodernist philosophers, on one hand, won’t 
bother to try, preoccupied as they are with the criticism of these very claims. 
Modernist philosophers, on the other hand, have been trying since the scientific 
revolution to underwrite them … and failing. Postmodern critiques, rooted in 
skeptical puzzles that worried some of the best Enlightenment thinkers (e.g., 
Hume), are evidence of this failure. Empirical science has nevertheless 
proceeded undeterred, with most empirical scientists remaining indifferent to 
philosophic doubts, while achieving marvelous insights.  
But the practice of science cannot be long sustained without the co-operation 
of our wider culture (legally, economically, pedagogically). This is the theoretical 
half of our present crisis. As the culture becomes more doubtful of scientific 
legitimacy—whether through postmodern philosophy, the rise of 
fundamentalism and superstition, or some other means—proponents of 
empirical science cannot remain indifferent to these doubts if the practice is to 
flourish. The best of them, the ones entertained by thoughtful people, must be 
addressed. But how can the skeptical critiques of modern science and philosophy 
be met? How can such puzzles be solved? The answers to these questions lie in 
an unexpected place.  
Assuming that reality is consistently ordered, a cosmos, Plato argues that the 
senses do not give us reality as it is because the appearances they present to us 
are inconsistent. Later skeptics would elaborate this argument, highlighting all 
the many ways that our sense-data are contradictory. The mountains look blue 
from a distance, but green close-up. Why assume that proximity gives us their 
accurate appearance? Maybe it is distance that reveals their real color instead. 
The pool-water feels cold after you’ve been lying in the sun, but warm as 
Platonism of the Future 
 
15 
 
compared with the windy air. Which is it, warm or cold? The examples are 
endless, and Sextus Empiricus is the place to go if you ever want more of them.  
But hasn’t empirical science silenced these doubts? Doesn’t our science of 
optics tell us the real color of the mountains by measuring the objective 
wavelength of the light they reflect? Doesn’t our science of kinetics tell us the 
real temperature of the water by measuring the objective motion of its 
molecules? Not, one last time, without begging the question. Upon what 
evidence, after all, have we become so sure of the sciences of optics and 
kinetics? The evidence of our senses: from the colors, sounds, and textures of 
innumerable screens, sensors, and instruments. What underwrites our 
confidence in these sense-data, which are susceptible to the same doubts?  
Not even neuroscience can close this gap, despite all the fascinating lessons it 
has been teaching us in recent decades about our brains, including how they 
process sense-data. For neuroscience is like any other empirical science: its 
evidence comes from the senses, the same range of colors, sounds, and textures 
that constitute all our other observations.  
 
 
5. Platonism and the Pursuit of Truth 
 
Recognizing the severity of this problem, skeptics of every era would have us 
suspend judgment about the sciences, giving philosophy a reputation for being 
anti-scientific. This is one error of the postmodernists. But Plato did not commit 
it. He was one of the first empirical scientists (see his Timaeus), and his best 
student (Aristotle) became one of history’s best empirical scientists. For Plato, 
and thus for Platonists, the world as it appears to us through the senses—the 
material world—may be no more than an image of reality, rather than reality 
itself, which is immaterial; but that does not mean it should be ignored. On the 
contrary, it merits rational study for that very reason. You can learn a lot about 
something by studying its images. 
 Moreover, it is from a study of reality’s images that one must begin, even if 
the goal of inquiry is ultimately to transcend them. According to Plato, reality is 
comprised of immaterial and eternal Forms, consistent objects accessible to our 
immaterial intellect. Only so can there be knowledge, because the knower and 
the known become one, foreclosing skeptical doubts. Only so is the truth good 
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for its own sake, because the supreme Form is the Good, the original reality of 
which all other goodness is an image. A search for truth is thus a search for 
Forms, and above all the Good. The reward for success in this search is becoming 
the best of all things, the source of all goodness.29 These doctrines are of course 
foreign to modern sensibilities, not to mention postmodern critique. Platonism 
is accordingly ridiculed by empirically minded thinkers—until it is recognized 
that most objections against it would also undermine mathematics, the study of 
immaterial and eternal numbers.  
Take two stones. What makes them two, rather than one or three? Is it merely 
the fact that we call them “two,” or some equivalent in another language? Is it 
merely the fact that we consider them so, whoever we are, whichever culture we 
inhabit? If so, the truth of “2 + 2 = 4”—to borrow an example from Orwell’s 
1984—would be relative to our ways of speaking and thinking.30 Were we to 
speak and think otherwise, the truth would change too. But if the two stones are 
two on account of something about them, regardless of what we think or say, 
there must be something they share that makes them so. It cannot be in either 
one, for then that one would be two. Nor can it be in both exclusively, for other 
things elsewhere and at other times can be two as well. If truths can be non-
relative, or absolute, there must be some realities that are in no specific place, at 
no specific time, which can account for them. These are Plato’s Forms. 
On one understanding of them, they are themselves mathematical structures, 
the hidden geometry of our world. It is no coincidence that Galileo’s father was a 
student of this tradition, or that Platonism flourished during the Renaissance. 
Returning to the present, the new theory of “digital physics,” that the universe is 
ultimately information rather than matter—“its from bits”—continues this 
tradition. 31  In truth, though, it’s not a theory in physics, but instead in 
metaphysics; it’s an account of reality beyond matter. Far from being anti-
scientific, then, Platonism gives science its best foundation. It solves the riddle 
of skepticism, saving science from futility, and it rescues truth from relativism, 
underwriting the broader pursuit of wisdom of which empirical science is only 
one part.  
                                                        
29 For a fuller account, see Miller 2011, Ch. 4. 
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A human being is born into a world of overpowering sensations and must 
make her way through sights and sounds to the truth that explains them. For the 
Platonist, though, the ultimate goal is not to know all the scientific truths, if 
ever that were possible, but rather to live the best possible life. To do so, she 
must know what is best. How else to distinguish what is good from what is bad, 
let alone make difficult decisions between competing goods? The value of 
everything, after all, depends on such wisdom. Being rich, for example, can do 
you more harm than good unless you know how to spend your money. So 
likewise for being famous or honored, if you don’t have a healthy contempt for 
flattery. Imagine someone whose narcissism has never been challenged by the 
demands of honest work or the sobering lesson of doing what’s best to general 
disapproval. These days, it’s not hard.  
Intellectuals who have devoted their lives to the pursuit of truth—again, the 
scientific community are exemplary—tend to believe that knowledge, unlike 
wealth and honor, is good for its own sake. But is it? It certainly isn’t good in the 
wrong hands. Knowing how to build a nuclear bomb may be good, for the right 
people in the right circumstances, but it is certainly bad for the wrong people in 
any circumstance. Yet that fact, if it be granted, argues only that the use of 
knowledge can be bad. What about the truth itself? Imagine it is never used, but 
merely known. Why, if at all, would this be good?  
What kind of account of the world could allow that truth is good for its own 
sake? The question cannot even be posed within postmodern worldviews, which 
do not accord any value to truth, which is only a fictional name for power. What 
about modern ones? They esteem the pursuit of objective truth—exemplified by 
empirical science, wherein the scientist sets aside her particular desires in order 
to explain the world dispassionately—but only as a means to other ends. “’Tis 
not contrary to reason,” wrote Hume, “to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the scratching of my finger.”32 It goes without saying, therefore, that ‘tis 
neither contrary to reason to prefer anything else—honor, wealth, power—to 
objective truth.  
Reason’s practical function according to Hume is not to find the truth, but to 
satisfy our preferences or desires. In part, then, he anticipates Mercier and 
Sperber, who, as we have seen, have agreed that reason’s function is not to find 
the truth. But their account was not merely negative; they conclude that reason 
                                                        
32 Treatise of Human Nature 2.3.3.6. 
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has a positive function. On this part, Hume is close. Reason is not for satisfying 
all preferences and desires, but only one in particular: the desire for social 
status. Have the empirical scientific findings of Darwinism on reasoning thus 
vindicated the empiricist philosophy of Hume and his modernist successors? Or 
have they bolstered the postmodernists, by elaborating Nietzsche’s early 
thinking about the vanity of reason? 
Both, in a way; in a way, neither. By granting truth only instrumental value, as 
a means rather than an end in itself, modernism hides a danger that 
postmodernism has made explicit. The postmodernist is contemptuous of truth 
as such, whereas the modernist pretends to care about it. But really, the 
modernist should care about truth only when it serves his purposes. Whenever it 
ceases to do so—witness the response of many intellectuals to Darwinism, 
forecast by Nietzsche’s seminal essay on truth—he should no longer care. He 
could still pursue it, but his motives would have to be external: money, if his job 
requires it; fame and honor, if prestige is won by discovering it. In the last resort, 
when neither wealth nor status can be won through inquiry, habit may be his 
only motive. 
This, by the way, was Nietzsche’s mature diagnosis of the scientific 
revolution.33 Enlightenment thinkers and their successors were still behaving as 
if truth were good for its own sake, even though their philosophies made this 
impossible. They carry on, Nietzsche argued, because they are running on the 
fumes of “the ascetic ideal,” especially Christianity, according to which God 
declares himself to be the Truth, the Way, and the Life. In Christianity, truth is 
good for its own sake—it’s divine, offering eternal felicity, or at least salvation 
from the fires of Hell—so its pursuit is compelling. Pursuing it for its own sake, 
as a modernist, makes sense only if the modernist is secretly an ascetic. That was 
Nietzsche’s conclusion. 
Some modernist thinkers are Christians, or ascetics of another faith, but more 
and more are not. One of the principal features of the modern era, at least in the 
West, has been secularization.34 Why would non-believers still devote their lives 
to the truth? For money? With some people, yes. It’s still possible to earn a 
living this way, although there are many more fertile fields for the growth of 
                                                        
33 Genealogy of Morality, Third Essay. (Available in Clark and Swensen 1988.) 
34 For a sophisticated account of the phenomenon, see Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age 
(2007). 
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capital. For status? With other people, perhaps. Professors are still more 
respected than lawyers, although that is changing.35 When money and status can 
be more easily achieved in less strenuous and lonely professions, then, why 
would any non-believer still choose this one?  
Nietzsche forecast that this question would haunt a culture that had lost its 
faith in the divinity of Truth. He forecast, in other words, the advent of 
postmodernism, calling it nihilism. Many think he was a nihilist, or a 
postmodernist ahead of his time. In fact, he was neither. He predicted that a 
culture that had reached this precipice without finding a new purpose would be 
doomed. Writing in 1887, he prophesied an unprecedented world-historical 
drama, a struggle between the destructive forces of nihilism and the hollow shell 
of European hopes. “That great drama in a hundred acts reserved for Europe in 
the next two centuries,” he wrote, “the most dubious drama but perhaps also the 
one most rich in hope …”36 
What was his hope? That from this drama would emerge new meanings, non-
ascetic meanings, for living. To this end, he preached an eternal return of the 
same—that time was not a line from past to future, but a circle for which the 
past is future—which would free humanity from the resentment over loss and 
death that fostered asceticism.37 If he was right about the crisis of modernity—
and I believe he was—we are past the midpoint of that drama, whose climax 
should surpass the awful opening acts of the 20th century. Whether or not he was 
right about the eternal return, well, that is not for us here to decide.  
Such questions are instead for the vanguard in this war, those who occupy 
neither trenches nor bunkers, but universities, or, if universities have become so 
enervated by internal critique and corporate corruption that they cannot any 
longer make the pursuit of grand truths and purposes their goal, then such 
questions must be debated openly wherever it is nowadays that thinkers can do 
so. Here we can say what must be true of any purpose—future or past—that 
could preserve the best facets of modernism (empirical science, universal rights 
and freedoms) while correcting the flaws that postmodernism has exposed in its 
philosophical foundation. Three requirements are salient. 
                                                        
35 http://www.chronicle.com/article/Most-Republicans-Think/240587 
36 On the Genealogy of Morality 3.27. Available in Clark and Swensen 1988. 
37 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part 2, “On Redemption.” (Available in Del Caro 2006.) For 
the best account of Nietzsche on the eternal return of the same, see Loeb 2010. 
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6. A Durable Purpose 
 
First of all, this purpose must conceive truth as good, if not The Good of Plato. 
Only with such a notion of truth could scientists pursue truth for its own sake, 
choosing this pursuit even when the activity of research, arduous even when it is 
uncontroversial, becomes unpopular, as it must, given the perennial human 
attraction to flattering illusions. Not unless you believe truth to be its own 
reward—a pearl of great price—will you endure the penury and obscurity, never 
mind the persecution, that occasionally attend its pursuit. Martyrs to the pursuit 
of truth need no memorial here, as their honor always soars after their cultures 
reconcile themselves to the shock of their discoveries. 
Secondly, this durable purpose must form a community so devoted to its 
pursuit that its members become capable of prosecuting this pursuit in the face 
of adversity and temptation. The solitary genius is a Romantic myth; difficult 
truths are found in concert with other reasoners, often in competition with one 
another. Reason is social, as Mercier and Sperber have demonstrated, so it goes 
quickly astray when it is exercised for too long in isolation.38 A truth-pursuing 
community must be formed not only with this fact in mind, but also vigilant 
against the vices endemic to common and competitive pursuits. Because reason 
aims to secure social status, there must be safeguards against reasoners’ 
satisfaction with the easy victories of conformity.  
The scientific community may be our best present model of such a 
community, but the training of its members is still insufficient to withstand the 
adversity and temptations of the crisis heralded by Nietzsche. Scientific training 
is rigorous, to be sure, but it is almost entirely intellectual. You can become a 
scientist—or for that matter a professor in most any field—without any formal 
character training. Without such training, how can you be expected to resist the 
vices endemic to social reasoning? The temptation for profit and the longing for 
prestige too easily compromise the pursuit of truth in every field. As the drama 
reaches its climax, the community of truth-lovers must be trained in both 
courage and temperance as well as the disciplines of the intellect.  
Thirdly, and finally, this durable purpose must legitimate a political order 
capable of granting citizens the stable freedom required for this complex 
training. A variety of purposes will satisfy the first two criteria, which is to say 
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that a variety of philosophies will rightfully claim to form communities of this 
sort. A certain plurality of such communities must therefore be permitted to 
flourish in one state. So too must other communities founded on other 
philosophical bases, communities who reject these criteria, or even this way of 
posing the problem—including the postmodernists, not to mention other 
philosophies not yet devised. For even if they would undermine the science and 
freedom protected by the constitution, were they to become dominant, they are 
beneficial to everyone so long as they do not.  
J. S Mill enumerated four such benefits. 39  In the midst of so much 
philosophical acrimony, they are all worth remembering. Your philosophical 
opponents may prove to be right: always grant them the opportunity to develop 
and defend their doctrines so that you may be corrected when you are wrong. 
Even when they are not wholly right, they may be onto a partial truth, which you 
could incorporate into your own doctrine to make it richer. And when they’re 
fully wrong, something that rarely ever happens, their challenge nonetheless 
forces you to go deeper into your own doctrine, understanding it better and 
formulating better arguments in its favor. Indeed, writes Mill, without engaging 
your opponents regularly in debate, “the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in 
danger of being lost or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character 
and conduct.” 
Postmodernists who wish to celebrate diversity nowadays are typically 
relativists. This is one reason they end up as hypocrites: preaching inclusion in 
theory, in practice they exclude anyone whose worldview threatens their group’s 
notion of diversity. This is why, when they speak of it, they refer to race, sex, and 
a host of other bodily differences, but never intellectual viewpoint. Modernists 
also wish to tolerate diversity, as On Liberty makes abundantly clear, but their 
primary concern is viewpoint (especially religion). In Mill’s account, the purpose 
of this toleration is the pursuit of truth. Everyone can pursue the truth better in 
the midst of vigorous debate. Notice, then, that the modernist case for 
toleration—and thus for liberalism—depends on the pursuit of truth. Only if that 
pursuit is coherent, only if truth is possible, can a liberal political order remain 
coherent. 
Surveying these three requirements—first, a notion of truth as good for its 
own sake; second, a community organized for the pursuit of truth and 
                                                        
39 Mill 1978: 50. 
Miller 
 
22 
 
empowered to train character as well as intellect; and third, a political order that 
permits a diversity of such communities—which of the many philosophies 
available to us should we choose as the new foundation for the modernists’ 
achievements (empirical science and universal rights), the foundation solid 
enough to support them without inviting the collapse presaged by Nietzsche? 
With regard to the first two requirements, many philosophies may stake a claim, 
but to my mind two stand out immediately: Platonism and Aristotelianism.  
 
 
7. Premodernism of the Future 
 
Both Plato and Aristotle put the divine at the summit of their cosmos, making 
union with it the supreme goal of life. Each did so in a different way—with 
epochal consequences for the rest of their philosophies—but neither left any 
room for doubt that pursuit of the truth was the best way to live, and 
achievement of it was the greatest happiness for us.40 In order that this pursuit 
might happen most efficiently, with the least opportunity for corruption, each 
founded a community that was concerned with character virtues as well as 
intellectual excellence. For Aristotle, this was the Lyceum; for Plato, the 
Academy. 41  Evidence about both is scarce, but Plato’s Republic is full of 
educational recommendations for philosophers, many of which address 
students’ characters.42 Some of these must have entered, in some way, into his 
training of real students.  
Both flourished in democratic Athens, yet each was ambivalent about this sort 
of constitution. They were critical of it, to be sure, but both also praised it with 
qualification. Believing many heads were better than one, Aristotle was the most 
sympathetic. 43  Plato observed that a democracy, while ostensibly one 
constitution, “contains all kind of constitutions, as a result of its license.”44 It is, 
in the popular meaning of the word, liberal. “Isn’t that a heavenly and pleasant 
                                                        
40 For Plato, see Republic 6. For Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10. This was nearly the 
consensus of Greek of Roman philosophers; see Miller 2012. 
41 For what little we know about each, see Hadot 2004: 55–90. 
42 See especially Republic 3 and 7.   
43 E.g., Politics 1295a–b.  
44 Republic 587d. 
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way to pass the time,” he adds, “while it lasts.”45 Some choose to read this as 
sarcasm, but it cannot be entirely so: democratic Athens executed his teacher, 
but it has also permitted Plato to develop and found his Academy; it could not 
have seemed to him all bad. Furthermore, as most readers either do not notice or 
quickly forget, Plato’s “utopia” is only his second best city. The perfect one is a 
place where equals enjoy simple pleasures.46  
In any event, the most serious problem with democracy is that it is unstable. 
A state that grants freedom and equality without any limits is bound to become 
tyrannical.47 Indeed, Plato recognizes that everything here (in the sensible, 
material, temporal world) is bound to perish, including his own utopia.48 He is 
generally regarded as advocating totalitarianism. Karl Popper famously agued 
that his utopia inspired 20th century dictators, although of the most notorious 
only Ayatollah Khomeini is on record as an actual reader of Republic. Yet Plato is 
careful to say that this utopia is not for this world below, but instead for the 
heavens.49 It remains open, therefore, for a Platonist to argue that the best 
regime for this fallen world is democracy, as Churchill said, because it is “the 
worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried 
from time to time.”  
The problem with democracy, highlighted by Plato, but never solved by his 
fellow Athenians, was how to make it last, how to keep it from degenerating into 
tyranny. We are still wrestling with this problem in our own times, most urgently 
in recent months, but we do so with more confidence, and more historical 
evidence, than either Plato or earlier Platonists could have had. For the decline 
of democracy into tyranny was also a problem that exercised the framers of the 
U.S. Constitution, who were sometimes aware of Plato particularly, but nearly 
always conversant in the ancient thinkers he influenced.  
“Polybius,” said John Adams of the Constitutional Convention of the summer 
of 1787, “was on everyone’s mind.” Benjamin Franklin suspected there were 
flaws in the document they produced, but he was a man of the world, well aware 
how difficult it is to achieve ideals perfectly, and so he said at the end of their 
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48 Republic 546a. 
49 Republic 450c, 472c–473b. 
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deliberations: “It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching 
so near to perfection as it does.” Assume for a moment, then, that it is possible 
to agree with Franklin and argue as a Platonist that the U.S. Constitution, with 
the many liberal democracies modeled upon it, does the best to meet the third 
requirement articulated above, providing an account of the political order best 
suited to the pursuit of truth, not to mention a coherent account of truth that is 
worth seeking for its own sake.  
Indulging that assumption, and granting everything claimed thus far, it still 
does not follow that we should choose Platonism, or for that matter 
Aristotelianism, as the way out of our present crisis simply because the minimal 
requirements of an escape have been met. How could we profess either 
philosophy as the way to secure the pursuit of truth without believing, and first 
arguing, that it is itself true? Someone such as Michael Aaron, who sees the 
present cultural conflict as a contest between modernists and postmodernists, 
while premodern philosophies (“traditionalism” in his terms) stand idly by, 
should not take seriously the claims of Platonists or Aristotelians to have 
resolved it unless they can be shown to be true. So: can they? 
That is obviously too large a question to be answered here. One does not 
present the case for a whole philosophy, answering all the credible objections to 
it, in one essay. Here we can at most consider two hints. Quickly, let us recall 
that the first requirement was already about truth itself. According to it, a 
durable philosophy—if not also a true philosophy—must conceive truth as 
something good for its own sake. If there are other philosophies besides 
Platonism and Aristotelianism that do so, while also making sense of the very 
notion (truth), they too must be assessed for whether they achieve this good 
end.  
That’s far harder than it might seem, and yet the premodern philosophies, 
whatever their other faults, did so naturally. If only for the purpose of brevity, 
then, let us focus on them, comparing their relative success or failure to 
assimilate the scientific advance most pertinent to their projects: Darwinism. 
This comparison will also involve, not coincidentally, a discussion of sexism. In 
this way, the kind of controversies that are presently drawing the lines between 
modernism and postmodernism (e.g., Googlegate) will coincide in an assessment 
of Plato and Aristotle.  
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8. Platonism of the Future 
 
Aristotelian philosophies (whether Christian, Jewish, or Muslim) have always 
suffered from several serious problems, but until Darwin it was reasonable to 
assume that these problems could be solved. Since Darwin, however, this hope 
has become unsustainable for a crucial one of these problems. Aristotle’s notion 
of the good is specific to each type of organism: the good for dogs is good for 
dogs but not for ferns, and vice versa.  
Humans, most importantly, are supposed to have a good unique to our 
species, a purpose inherent to our kind of bodies. Aristotelian ethics and politics 
thus depend on our species having an essence and a goal inherent to this 
essence. His practical philosophy depends, in technical terms, on natural 
teleology. Yet in the wake of Darwin’s revolution, it is clear to most thinkers that 
there is no such thing—at least not as Aristotle understands it.50 Put another 
way, Aristotle’s practical philosophy ties the human good too tightly to the 
human body, as something stable across generations, with an innate essence 
that supplies a natural goal.  
It was this mistake that led Aristotle to argue, for example, that women were 
inferior to men. If the good of each type of organism is inherent to its type of 
body, the bodily differences between women and men should have some 
consequences for their fulfillment of the human goal. “Silence is a woman’s 
glory,” he wrote, quoting a traditional poet in his argument that women may 
have had reason, but that they were unable to use it, as mature men could, to 
counteract their unruly emotions.51 The roots of this political argument go down 
into his ethics and psychology, then deeper into his physics and embryology, 
which understood women as malformed men.52 Aristotle’s “scientific” sexism 
thus stands with Kant’s “scientific” racism as an infamous illustration of the 
postmodernists’ critique of truth.  
Even if they exaggerated that critique by claiming that all pursuits of truth are 
exertions of power, however, they were right that some philosophical and 
scientific theories are rationalizations for injustice. (Whatever the fate of 
                                                        
50 See, e.g., Dupré 1995, part I, chapters 1–3. 
51 Politics 1260a30. Available in Barnes 1984.  
52 See, e.g., Generation of Animals 737a28 (also 775a15–16 and 784a5). Available in 
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postmodern philosophy, this insight will forever be its contribution to our 
intellectual culture.) Considering only the injustice of sexism, we should note in 
passing that Plato argued against the grain of Athenian misogyny to the 
conclusion that women should be given the same educational and political 
opportunities as men, right up to the office of Philosopher-Queen.53  
As for Aristotle’s “scientific” sexism, Aristotelians have recently argued that 
it can be eliminated from his philosophy—rather as Kantians argue that his 
philosophy can be purified of its original racism. Whether or not those 
arguments succeed, Aristotelians cannot escape their problem with Darwin. 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals, for example, is a sustained 
effort to present human biology in a way that maintains Aristotelian ethics 
without remaining committed to the outmoded aspects of Aristotelian biology. 
Yet the effort fails. It remains committed to the notions of species, natural 
teleology, and flourishing. At one point, MacIntyre even explicitly brackets 
evolutionary concerns, something he must do in order to preserve the coherence 
of the whole project.54 
MacIntyre’s failure to reconcile Aristotle with Darwin is especially important 
for the argument of this essay. For it was MacIntyre who first saw that the 
soundness of certain postmodern critiques of modern philosophy would require 
returning to premodern philosophy in order to find philosophical foundations 
that modernism could not supply. Unlike this essay, though, he did not argue for 
preserving what is valuable in the modern, but instead for refashioning culture 
on a premodern basis. In his first and most famous effort, After Virtue, this basis 
was supposed to be Aristotle, exemplified by the choice posed by the subtitle of 
its final chapter: “Nietzsche or Aristotle?” Those were roughly the alternatives: a 
revived Aristotelian account of social life, or a Nietzschean dancing over the 
abyss of an exhausted modernism.  
The title of that chapter was in fact longer: “After Virtue: Nietzsche or 
Aristotle, Trotsky and St. Benedict.” However it was that Marxist revolution and 
Christian monasticism were supposed to be compatible, MacIntyre eventually 
focused exclusively on the less radical, Thomistic version of Aristotle. This made 
his revival of Aristotle more plausible, by giving it the concrete institution of the 
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(56), 
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Catholic Church for social influence, but to many non-Catholics this move was 
obviously alienating. 55  Catholic Aristotelianism, whether in the person of 
MacIntyre or Robert George, is the intellectual component of the traditionalism 
Aaron rejects for its lack of “social influence.” Whatever its social influence, 
though, Darwin had already doomed its intellectual potential. Both MacIntyre 
and George try, in different ways, to underwrite their moral philosophy by 
appeals to biology, but each fails to account for the perpetual flux at the heart of 
Darwin’s account of nature.56 
To Platonism, by contrast, Darwin poses no threat. On the contrary, when you 
believe, as Platonists do, that the physical world is but “a moving image of 
eternity”—where nothing we perceive through our senses will have a permanent 
form, and everything tangible must be in perpetual flux—you should expect 
something like Darwinism to be true, long before it receives the imprimatur of 
empirical science.57 This is not to say that you would credit natural evolutionary 
theories before they received confirmation through experiments and the other 
techniques of modern science. Instead, you might propose it as a hypothesis 
awaiting confirmation, with the equanimity of a thinker who fears no inquiry, 
wanting only to know the truth, whatever it is, because the truth is good for its 
own sake. 
Disputes between Platonists and Aristotelians about the effect of modern 
biology on philosophy, not to mention the ancient debates about the correct 
conception of the relationship of matter and form, are not appropriate for this 
occasion.58 So too must we bypass for now many interesting quarrels over the 
relationship between reason as it is understood by Darwinians, as a tool for 
achieving social status, and reason as it has been understood by Platonists and 
Aristotelians alike, as something inherently aimed towards the truth. As a hint, 
with a tip of the hat to Plotinus, we might say that embodied reason is an image 
of the pure intellect of our disembodied soul, just as social status is an image of 
the true good beyond powers and principalities.59 But for now, that must remain 
                                                        
55 See, e.g., MacIntyre 1988 and 1989. 
56 See, e.g., George et al. 2012. 
57 “Moving image” (Timaeus 28a). An anticipation of Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection was available to Plato in the poem of Empedocles (B57, B59, B60, B61). 
58 For a hint of such theoretical disputes, see Gerson 1990: chapter 3, especially 139–41. 
59 Enneads 1.1. Available in Armstrong 2000: 95–121. 
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only a hint. For the natural home of such quarrels, debates, and disputes is 
within the walls of a properly oriented university. 
To summarize: such a university will be an institution that seeks truth as 
something good for its own sake, an institution that motivates this pursuit as 
integral to a life well-lived, and finally an institution that recognizes the 
corrupting influence of power upon this pursuit and strives to mitigate this 
corruption with disciplines of character as well as intellect. My suggestion here, 
which must therefore remain at most a suggestion, is that such an institution 
should look to those of Athens in the 4th century BC. Not those of London of the 
18th century, nor Berlin of the 19th, century, never mind Paris of the 20th century. 
We should look backwards not because we wish to backwards, in the manner of 
the traditionalists mentioned by Aaron, but because we long to move forward 
again. What we need, in short, is neither modernism nor postmodernism, but a 
peculiar sort of premodernism … a premodernism of the future.  
More precisely, we should not build our new institution on the plan of the 
Lyceum, as for too long the universities of Europe were. Instead we should look 
toward another place outside Athens’ walls, a field named Acadēmia, owned by a 
certain Plato. On that ground we can begin to build the Platonism we need, a 
Platonism of the future. 
 
Patrick Lee Miller  
Duquesne University  
miller.patricklee@gmail.com 
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